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ARTICLE
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
BY SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Al-Qaeda struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, pres-
idential power has been at the forefront of constitutional law. Critics casti-
gated President George W. Bush for his detention policies,1 military
tribunals,2 signing statements,3 interrogation techniques,4 surveillance,5 fir-
ing of U.S. attorneys,6 and broad conception of executive power.7 This lit-
any is necessarily truncated in the interests of space.
One of the most eloquent and trenchant critics of President Bush was
Illinois Senator Barack Obama. While running for President, the freshman
Senator inspired many with lofty rhetoric and his promise to heal America.
He especially heartened the small cohort of constitutional law professors.
* James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, Paul Mahoney Research Professor of
Law, and Miller Center Senior Fellow, University of Virginia. This piece stems from a keynote
address at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal’s symposium on Presidential Executive
Power Under the Constitution. Thanks to Michael Paulsen for encouragement and friendship and
gratitude to the University of St. Thomas students for an excellent symposium. Thanks to Joseph
Barakat for exceptional research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Robert Creamer, How Bush’s Policies in the Muslim World Played into Ter-
rorists’ Hands—Can Obama Reverse Course?, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/how-bushs-policies-in-the_b_169045.html.
2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Blocks Guanta´namo Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES
(June 29, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/29/washington/29cnd-scotus.html?mcubz=1.
3. See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, Bush’s Tactic of Refusing Laws is Probed, WASH. POST
(July 24, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/23/AR20060723
00511.html.
4. See, e.g., THE DAILY DISH, “Verscha¨rfte Vernehmung”, ATLANTIC (May 29, 2007),
https://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2007/05/-versch-auml-rfte-vernehmung/228158/.
5. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-
callers-without-courts.html?mcubz=1.
6. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, What’s Really Wrong with the Bush Justice Department, SLATE
(Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/
hyper_hacks.html.
7. See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Unchecked and Unbalanced, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/books/06book.html?mcubz=1.
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Maybe one day, we too could become Senator or President and, at last, do
something useful.
Candidate Obama was bracingly transparent about his stances on exec-
utive power, due in part to a revealing interview with Charles Savage.8 Sen-
ator Obama did not think that presidents could take the nation to war.9 He
did not believe that presidents could denounce statutes as unconstitutional
immediately after signing them.10 He did not suppose that presidents could
ignore statutes regulating the military.11 Senator Obama promised that upon
his ascension to the highest office in the land, he would restore the rule of
law and a more constrained presidency.12
A funny thing happened on the way to the White House (or, more
likely, once the Senator got there). Without any congressional authoriza-
tion, President Obama took the nation to war against Libya.13 President
Obama issued signing statements denouncing as unconstitutional the very
statutes he had just signed and claimed the right to ignore statutes that pur-
ported to limit his authority as commander in chief.14 He continued, in large
respect, the broad outlines of President Bush’s detention policies.15 When it
came to presidential power, President Obama’s first and second terms often
seemed as if they were the third and fourth terms of President Bush. Ameri-
cans could be forgiven for recalling the common farm animals from George
Orwell’s Animal Farm, who, when they gazed into the farmhouse at the end
of the story, could not make out the pigs from the humans.
President Obama cannot be faulted too much, for he fell victim to an
iron law of politics: where you stand on executive power turns on where
you sit. When he sat in the Senate, the presidency was a much more modest
office, at least from his vantage point. Once installed in the White House,
ensconced behind the Resolute Desk, things looked very different. Like al-
most all his predecessors, he came to better appreciate (and see the wisdom
of) the broad sweep of power that supposedly comes with the Oval Office.
We ought not to judge President Trump by his campaign statements on
presidential power. I say that not because he deserves a free pass. Rather, I





12. See Press Release, Barack Obama, Obama Pledges Most Transparent and Accountable
Administration in History, (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=93244.
13. See Charlie Savage, Attack Renews Debate over Congressional Consent, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22powers.html?mcubz=1.
14. See Stephen Dinan, Obama Circumvents Constitution with “Signing Statements” after
Blasting Bush, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/
26/obama-circumvents-constitution-with-signing-statem/.
15. See, e.g., Connie Bruck, Why Obama has Failed to Close Guantanamo, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-close-
guantanamo.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 3 14-SEP-18 8:59
2018] THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 629
do not believe he ever adopted or expressed any considered views on the
subject. His statements about President Obama’s abuses of presidential
power were nothing more than the jetsam and flotsam of campaign rhetoric.
Only those taken in by campaign rhetoric would have regarded his claims
about presidential power seriously. Compared to President Obama—who
knew something of presidential power, having taught constitutional law at
the University of Chicago—President Trump was and is a greenhorn.
In any event, that iron law of politics—where you stand depends upon
where you sit—does not just apply to politicians and presidents. It also
applies, in its own way, to observers of politics, the hoi polloi, the com-
mentariat, and the professoriate. Some critics of George W. Bush’s presi-
dency exhibited a strange silence as President Obama expanded presidential
powers in his own way, expending funds without appropriations,16 chang-
ing the effective date of statutes,17 and taking enforcement discretion to
new frontiers of non-enforcement.18 And some defenders of President
Bush’s muscular executive actions acquired a newfound appreciation for
limits on presidential power. We see the same volte-face during the admin-
istration of Donald J. Trump. Expansive presidential power is in vogue
again in quarters where its virtues went largely unnoticed for eight years.
And unabashed fans of President Obama’s unilateralism are becoming reac-
quainted with the vices of expansive executive power.
Some might say that the only phenomenon that one can count on is
that views of presidential power change as the occupants of the White
House change. Yet, with the advent of President Trump, I think the situa-
tion is ripe for a sober, detached reassessment and an abandonment of peri-
odic flip-flopping on presidential power. Democrats and Republicans,
formalists and functionalists, originalists and living constitutionalists have
seen the perils of accommodating presidents and their pretensions to vast
power. Everybody has had their ox gored and perhaps many agree that the
bleeding ought to stop.
This essay makes four contributions. First, it describes the presidency
of the Founders, a description that relies on my book, Imperial from the
16. See United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174
(D.D.C. 2016) (finding that the government’s grants of funds to insurance companies violated the
Constitution as Congress did not “appropriate monies” for the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”)
cost-sharing arrangement).
17. See, e.g., Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Pol’y, Dep’t of Treasury, to
Fred Upton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (July 9, 2013) (describing the
Treasury Department’s decision to provide “transition relief,” thereby delaying the implementa-
tion of the ACA’s employer mandate).
18. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 184 (5th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the
Immigration and Nationality Act “flatly does not permit reclassification of millions of illegal
aliens as lawfully present” in the United States through the Deferred Action for Parents of Ameri-
cans and Lawful Permanent Residents program).
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Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Presidency.19 Second, it con-
siders the presidency we have today. Third, it hazards predictions about the
future of executive power. Fourth, it proposes reforms that Congress could
enact that might restrain the presidency.
II. THE PRESIDENCY, AS IT WAS
Prior to writing my book, Imperial from the Beginning, I had written
over a dozen articles on the presidency, with a keen focus on the original
presidency. These articles tended to hone in on a single issue and focus on it
relentlessly. As a result, I had a solid grasp of particular areas: law execu-
tion, removal, unity, foreign relations, war powers, congressional/executive
relations, and emergency powers. But this was something of a patchwork
understanding because the presidency had so many other facets. In effect, I
had mile-deep understandings of a handful of areas. This perspective was
bound to give me something of a distorted picture of the original
presidency.
While researching and writing my book, I discovered a number of un-
expected features of the presidency and became aware of several paths de-
liberately not taken by the founders. Some of my findings were surely
known by other scholars; others were discoveries that are mine alone.
Below, I list ten bombshells about the original presidency that I dis-
covered during my exploration of the original presidency. Of course, they
are not genuine bombshells.  I have no evidence indicating that Thomas
Jefferson was George Washington’s son or that James Madison was the
brother of Alexander Hamilton. Rather, they are what pass for bombshells
in constitutional scholarship.
1. Features that seem obvious to us—a singular chief executive, the
(relative) independence of the executive, the power to appoint, the authority
to make treaties—were hardly obvious at the founding. The delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention struggled with these and other elements of the ex-
ecutive.20 They would move in one direction and make some decision.
Later, at the urging of dissenters, they would often revisit that original
choice and move in a rather different direction. The sophisticated debates,
with their twists and turns, unmistakably reveal that we easily could have
had a rather different executive. Imagine an executive who served during
good behavior. Or one who served at the pleasure of Congress. Imagine a
plural executive, a triumvirate, drawn from different regions of the nation.
Or a nominal chief executive burdened by the requirement that he obtain
the consent of a council on all matters of significance. Consider a pure law-
enforcement executive, one shorn of foreign affairs authorities. Or consider
19. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015).
20. Id. at 37–42, 116–119, 171–181.
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one with all foreign affairs authorities. Each of these was possible.21 Other
than that the new constitution would establish a distinct executive charged
with law enforcement, nothing else was remotely inevitable. Everything
else was up for grabs.
2. The final contours of the executive they fashioned were tailor made
for the President they anticipated. Numerous delegates said the executive
was far, far more powerful than many would have initially favored. Dele-
gates repeatedly glanced at the chair of the Philadelphia Convention,
George Washington, assumed that he would be heading the executive
branch, and created an office with him in mind.22 Some delegates lamented
this tendency, noting that presidential authority accreted over the Conven-
tion and that not all future presidencies would have the wisdom, forbear-
ance, or experience of the Commander in Chief of the Continental Army.23
This tale of an inflating executive demonstrates the power of context.
Where one stands on some matter not only reflects where one sits, but also
reflects who sits before you. Imagine what the presidency would have
looked like if the Constitution had been written in the wake of the Declara-
tion of Independence. Back in 1776, a strong executive was greatly feared,
leading to the creation of anemic executives in the states.24 Similarly, con-
sider what the presidency would look like if Richard Nixon’s presidency
immediately preceded a constitutional convention. We might very well
have a “cypher” executive that James Madison belittled as inadequate.25
3. The Executive Power Clause of Article II (often called the “Vesting
Clause”) was a significant font of authority. The core of Article II is not
Article II, section 2—the section that discusses treaties, appointments, par-
dons, and the Commander in Chief. Rather, the central provision is to be
found in the very first sentence of Article II. The framers followed the ex-
ample of drafters of the state constitution, almost all of whom conveyed
generic executive powers to their state executives, whether unitary or plu-
ral.26 Some expressly provided that state executives would enjoy “other ex-
ecutive powers.”27 Others made clear exceptions to the grant of “executive
powers,” thereby confirming that their vesting clauses were generic
grants.28
The Executive Power Clause amounts to a grant of executive authority,
subject to the many exceptions and qualifications found elsewhere in Arti-
cle II and in the Constitution. As James Madison said in Federalist No. 41,
21. Id. at 37–42, 116–119.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 31–35.
25. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 33 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
26. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 73–77. R
27. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. XIX (1776); DEL. CONST. art. VII (1776).
28. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. XIX (1777); VA. CONST. (1776).
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“[n]othing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase,
and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.”29 That was the
precise structure of Article II. The “executive power” included authority
over law execution, foreign affairs, and control of executive officers. Nu-
merous founders, including Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jeffer-
son, and George Washington said as much.30 And early statutes amply
reflected that conception of the Vesting Clause. Congress’s statutes as-
sumed that the President had authorities traceable to that Clause.31 Finally,
early practice conformed to this view, with the President taking actions no-
where authorized by statute and not traceable to Article II, section 2.32 The
source of authority was the grant of executive power.
4. Enacting laws used to be more difficult due to an obscure under-
standing now utterly lost to us. Today we follow a “Congress” rule for
enacting legislation, meaning that the chambers can enact bills over a par-
ticular two-year period, what we commonly call a “Congress.”33  If a bill
passes one chamber on March 4 of an odd year and the other chamber
passes the bill almost two years later, say on March 1, the chambers can
present the bill to the President. If both chambers do not enact the bill in
one Congress, the entire process must begin anew in the next Congress.
This means that if one chamber passes a bill on January 2 of an odd year,
right before the change in Congress, and the other chamber passes it a day
later, on January 3, the first chamber must repass the bill before Congress
can present the bill to the President.
At the founding, Congress and the President followed a “session” rule
because they believed that the Constitution required as much. Under En-
glish practice, a legislative “session” was imbued with deep meaning. The
“session” was the period for perfecting legislation. Bills not signed into law
at the end of a legislative session had to start from scratch in the next. This
meant that if a bill was to be presented to the President, both chambers had
to pass it in a single session. If a bill did not become law in one session,
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 301 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
30. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 65. R
31. Most notably, in the Decision of 1789, Congress recognized that the Vesting Clause
granted the President constitutional power to remove the Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs at will. Id. at 266.
32. For example, early presidents repeatedly directed prosecutors to bring prosecutions. Id. at
89–91. Perhaps the most famous example occurred when President Washington issued the Neu-
trality Proclamation, pledging to initiate prosecutions against “all persons, who shall . . . violate
the law of nations.” Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 430–431 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
33. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons
of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 689 (1993) (“Individual Congresses expire
every two years. Bills passed by only one house have no legal significance. To become laws, they
must be passed by both houses and not vetoed by the president within the same term of
Congress.”).
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both chambers had to pass the bill anew in a new session.34 That is why
presidents invariably hastened to Congress in the waning hours of every
session, laboring under candlelight and poring over dozens of bills.35 If they
did not sign those bills during the session in which the two chambers had
passed them, both chambers would have to repass them in the next session.
The President could not sign the bills into law after the session ended. Fur-
thermore, a return of the bills after the session would have been pointless
because the process had to begin anew in the next session, regardless of the
return.36
5. The Commander in Chief (“CINC”) was a rather weak office. It did
not encompass power to commence wars, nor did it grant an exclusive
power to decide how wars declared by Congress would be waged. A CINC
was simply an officer who controlled an army or portion thereof.37 That is
why the British army had hundreds of CINCs—of platoons, brigades, geo-
graphical regions, etc. None of these CINCs enjoyed illimitable authority
by being the chief commander.38
America’s first CINC, George Washington, was a puppet of the Conti-
nental Congress. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress
commanded the CINC in all sorts of ways. The office was bereft of author-
ity to appoint or remove military officers and soldiers.39 Congress con-
trolled appointments and removal, with Congress occasionally granting
temporary authority to remove because a commander in chief, without
more, had no authority to oust soldiers and officers.40 Washington’s trou-
bles with General Horatio Gates partly turned on the absence of absolute
control and the possibility that Congress might replace the former with the
latter. Relations also were strained by Gates’s failure to consult with Wash-
ington prior to drafting a plan to invade Canada and the fact that Congress
had appointed Gates to the Board of War; a board technically superior to
the CINC.41
The issuance of congressional diktats to the CINC continued after the
Constitution’s ratification. Congress determined where troops would be sta-
tioned. It determined whom the United States would fight. It decided the
type of war to be fought (naval, land, or both). It decided the proper sorts of
targets (all enemy ships or only a subset). It decided where the enemy could
be attacked (on the high seas, on American territory, or anywhere). And it
34. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 247–248. R
35. Id. at 247–248.
36. Id. at 250–251.
37. Id. at 152–153.
38. Id.
39. PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 37. R
40. Id. at 154, 210.
41. GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S GENERALS AND OPPONENTS 98 (1964).
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decided the strategic goals of American warfare (territorial conquest or the
protection of commerce).42
6. American CINCs lacked any sort of emergency power. In time of
war, they could not take property, suspend habeas corpus, or try civilians in
military courts. The Continental Congress granted authority to suspend
habeas corpus, take property, and try civilians before military courts. It au-
thorized such acts because it understood that the CINC would otherwise
lack such authority.43 These principles continued under the Constitution,
with no one claiming that the President had emergency authority, in time of
war or peace.44 President Washington never claimed that he had anything
resembling an emergency power to handle crises. In response to a yellow
fever outbreak in the nation’s capital, he denied that he could summon Con-
gress to some other place, making a suggestion instead.45 In the wake of the
Whiskey Rebellion, he similarly hewed close to his established statutory
authorities, always carefully satisfying the conditions Congress imposed on
the summoning and use of the state militias.46
7. The contretemps about torture that took place during the George W.
Bush administration—whether Congress could bar torture of prisoners—
had precedents from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In those centu-
ries, the law of war authorized reprisals against soldiers—what the Romans
called “lex talionus.”47 The idea was that if one nation mistreated the
soldiers and sailors of another, the other nation could respond in kind as a
means of deterring further mistreatment. Sometimes Congress merely au-
thorized such retaliation.48 Other times, it affirmatively required the Presi-
dent to engage in retaliation.49
The episodes suggest that the President lacks the constitutional author-
ity to mistreat prisoners. That is why Congress had to pass statutes authoriz-
ing retaliation. But more significantly the episodes also suggest that
Congress can regulate the treatment of prisoners. Congress can choose to
safeguard foreign prisoners or it can choose to abuse them. The CINC must
carry out the choices of Congress, whatever they may be.
42. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 162. R
43. Id. at 210, 217–219.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 212–214.
46. Id. at 211.
47. See Laws of the Twelve Tables, in 1 THE CIVIL LAW: INCLUDING THE TWELVE TABLES,
THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE RULES OF ULPIAN, THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS, THE ENACTMENTS OF
JUSTINIAN, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS 57, 70 n.1 (Samuel Parsons Scott ed., 1932).
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1813, ch. 61, 2 Stat. 829–830 (authorizing the president to “cause full and
ample retaliation to be made” should England commit “any violations of the laws and usages of
war” against Americans during the War of 1812).
49. See Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743 (requiring the president to “cause the most
rigorous retaliation to be executed on any such [captured] citizens of the French Republic” should
the French mistreat American prisoners during the Quasi-War with France).
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8. While serving as president, Washington continued to have private
dealings of various sorts. Citizen Washington threatened suit all the time in
his personal capacity, primarily in his roles as a vast landowner and bond-
holder.50 He also served as trustee for several estates, having agreed to do
so before becoming president.51 Indeed, one state court ordered him to print
an advertisement related to his trusteeship of an estate. The advertisement,
printed in London, conspicuously noted that George Washington was “or-
dered” to print the advertisement.52
Though no one sued Citizen Washington, I rather doubt that the Presi-
dent thought he had any temporary immunity from suits arising out of his
personal affairs. If Citizen Washington could sue and threaten to sue, it
would have been unfathomable and incongruous for him to claim some
temporary immunity from suits arising out of his personal life.
9. Titles matter. In the first year of the new government, there was a
long debate about how the chambers ought to address the President. Some
Senators wanted a title meant to suggest majesty in the office. John Adams,
presiding over the Senate, was particularly emphatic, deriding “President”
as far too pedestrian. Cricket clubs and firehouses have “presidents,”
sneered Senator Oliver Ellsworth when arguing for a loftier title.53 Though
the House refused to go along with the Senate, Americans settled on “the
Honorable” for the President.54
While Adams thought “President” too plain, Samuel Johnson’s famous
Dictionary of the English Language defined “President” as, among other
things, a “monarch”!55 Johnson took this definition from Shakespeare’s
Antony and Cleopatra.56 Perhaps Adams was mistaken to dismiss the Con-
stitution’s title as too pedestrian.
Finally, one Frenchman suggested that future presidents would be
known as “Washington” just as “Caesar” had become a title denoting leader
in multiple languages.57 This never happened, of course. But had powerful,
republican executives become linked with the title “Washington” it would
have been entirely appropriate.
10. Although the presidency was limited in a host of ways, the resem-
blance to a monarchy was palpable. The numerous constraints should not
fool or confuse us. While the President was not to be an absolute monarch,
50. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 227. R
51. Id.
52. Notice, LONDON GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1796, at 1222.
53. PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 26. R
54. Id. at 45.
55. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792) (entry for
“monarch”).
56. Id.
57. Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 9, 1789), in 16 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, CORRESPONDENCE: FIRST SESSION JUNE–
AUGUST 1789, at 729, 734 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004).
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the presidency was more powerful than any existing American executive
and some crowned European monarchs. Anti-federalists repeatedly re-
marked that the Constitution had created an elective monarch.58 Other ob-
servers, including John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and some foreigners said
the same.59  As the Dutch Stadtholder said, “You have given yourself a king
with the title of president.”60
Yet we cannot see the resemblance. We cannot because we suffer from
a form of cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, we know that there are
bicycle monarchs in Europe, who have titles and a measure of respect but
no real political power. And we know that elective monarchs have long
existed and continue to exist around the world. So, we are familiar with
weak monarchs and elective ones. On the other hand, we also suppose that
America rebelled against a monarchy and could not erect one in its place.
The Declaration is an indictment of a powerful executive. It seems un-
fathomable to suppose that a powerful executive might emerge from the
Convention, albeit several years after the Revolution’s conclusion.
But in truth, the English monarchy was a limited republic. Montes-
quieu himself said that England was a republic disguised as a monarchy.61
When you compare the actual powers of the President with the English
crown, the President is rather powerful. Many of the Crown’s formal pow-
ers were not exercised without parliamentary sanction (the power to declare
war, for instance).62 Others had atrophied due to nonuse—like the veto.63
Moreover, the overwrought reaction to the perceived excesses of
George III eventually brought a counterrevolution in thought. Many observ-
ers, including Washington, Hamilton, and Madison, supposed that America
desperately needed a much stronger federal executive.64 Because context
matters, it is a mistake to read the Constitution as if it were written contem-
poraneously with the Declaration.
Hence, when learned observers, foreign and domestic, beheld the pres-
idency, they perceived the features of an elective monarch. This republican
monarch would steward foreign affairs, execute the laws, command the mil-
itary, and superintend executive officers. Because the executive was uni-
tary, rather formidable, and yet still limited in authority, labeling the
Constitution’s presidency a republican monarch was entirely fitting.
58. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 19–20. R
59. Id. at 20–21.
60. Letter XI from John Adams to John Taylor (1814), in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
469, 470 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851) (recounting and translating comments made in 1788
by William V, Prince of Orange).
61. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 84 (Batoche Books 2001) (1748).
62. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 14. R
63. Id. at 239, 251.
64. Id. at 33–35.
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III. THE PRESIDENCY, AS IT IS
As almost everyone supposes, the executive has become more power-
ful over time. Many find this accretion of power alarming. The specter is
monarchy, with historian Arthur Schlesinger coining the memorable phrase
“Imperial Presidency.”65 Indeed, even though the presidency was imperial
from the beginning, this trope has continuing political currency. It reverber-
ates more than forty years after Schlesinger’s book came out. Critics un-
doubtedly enjoyed calling George W. Bush “King George.”66 And a
different set of critics delighted in comparing Barack Obama to the
monarchs, absolutist or not, of old.67
But nothing is new under the sun. Schlesinger merely coined a phrase
for a claim that has flourished from the beginning. Jeffersonians called
Washington an “embryo-Caesar;”68 Whigs depicted Andrew Jackson as a
crowned despot, “King Andrew the First,” standing on a rent Constitu-
tion;69 and Democrats decried Abraham Lincoln as a foul dictator who
usurped congressional power and invaded civil liberties.70 Almost every
president is perceived as an aggressive monarch or a usurping despot.
Still it is useful to contemplate the accretion of monarchical trappings.
The modern presidency is not the unpretentious one sought by some early
politicians, including Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. Indeed, they
rained fury on Washington for his “royal” levees and his lavish coach, with
its four liveried attendants and six bay horses.71 But things have progressed
beyond these relatively modest beginnings. Whereas Washington began his
presidency in a comparatively small mansion on a corner in Manhattan, the
Samuel Osgood House,72 every modern president presides in what would be
described elsewhere as an actual palace—the magnificent White House.
The president has his palace guard—the dour, silent, and secretive Secret
Service. He has courtiers who often tell him how bold and brilliant he is—
we call them the White House staff. He holds lavish state dinners, where
elaborate repasts are served to foreign heads of state and those whom the
President wishes to shower with affection. He has modern coaches—the
65. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
66. See, e.g., Senator Says Bush Is Acting like “King George,” ABC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2005),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Politics/story?id=1418046.
67. See, e.g., Kevin Robillard, Rand Paul: “King” Obama, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2013), http://
www.politico.com/story/2013/01/rand-paul-king-obama-086246.
68. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 27. R
69. See King Andrew the First, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/
2008661753/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
70. See generally Jennifer L. Weber, Lincoln’s Critics: The Copperheads, 32 J. ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ASS’N 33 (2011).
71. Id.
72. See STEPHEN DECATUR, JR., PRIVATE AFFAIRS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: FROM THE
RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS OF TOBIAS LEAR, ESQUIRE, HIS SECRETARY 117 (1933).
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presidential state car (codenamed the “Stagecoach”),73 Marine One, and Air
Force One. He has his own ditty—”Hail to the Chief”—one borrowed from
the British. Compare the president to the queen of England. Admittedly, she
is surrounded by more pomp. She has more palaces too. But the presidency
is hardly lacking in pageantry.
The presidency is also more monarchical in terms of power. As
Schlesinger recounted, the presidency has acquired greater authority over
the military, warfare, and the initiation of wars. Modern presidents claim
authority to start world wars, ignore congressional attempts to direct those
wars (dismissed as unconstitutional and misbegotten “micromanagement”),
and disregard generic congressional regulation of the military. The modern
president has more practical power to wage war than did King George III,
for the latter invariably went to Parliament before the onset of war to secure
the necessary funds.74 Modern presidents seem more concerned with the
optics of warfare than any legal niceties. They tend to go to Congress only
when they know they will receive a fillip—a resounding “yes” to war.
The presidency also has benefitted from the enormous enlargement of
the federal government, with its ever-expanding welfare state. A bur-
geoning bureaucracy generally (though not inevitably) yields greater presi-
dential power over it and the rules it crafts and administers. Modern
presidents command a vast bureaucracy consisting of millions of functiona-
ries. Now their command can be more apparent than real in that the bureau-
cracy—the so-called “deep state”—may thwart rather than heed their
orders. Harry Truman gleefully predicted that Dwight Eisenhower’s presi-
dential commands would be ignored, resisted, and thwarted—”poor Ike”
will “sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen.”75
This was not quite true, for a president deeply committed to a handful of
tasks over which he has ultimate control, can prevail even over the deep
state.
Edward Corwin’s claim that the President is the Chief Legislator be-
comes ever truer over time.76 Whereas before, President Washington
merely recommended legislative topics for the consideration of Congress,77
the modern President has far more authority. As party leader, the President
ordinarily commands the respect and fealty of his co-partisans in Congress,
often able to spur them to support his often vast and sometimes detailed
legislative agenda. Moreover, as the locus of federal lawmaking has shifted
73. See Joseph Trevithick, The Presidential Motorcade Is on Full Display as the President
Tours Asia, DRIVE (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15871/the-presidential
-motorcade-is-on-full-display-as-trump-tours-asia.
74. PRAKASH, supra note 20, at 14.
75. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 10 (1990).
76. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984
(1984).
77. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 246–247. R
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from Congress to the agencies, many of which are under the President’s
thumb, the President may shape the laws (regulations) that emerge from
these agencies. These laws often are of far more significance than the often
indefinite and undetailed framework statutes that authorize them. Relatedly,
because there are so many federal laws, he can, by setting enforcement
priorities, decide which laws to enforce and which to ignore. All in all, the
President functions as a unitary, junior-varsity Congress.
Some changes to the presidency stem from certain extragovernmental
changes. As noted earlier, presidents are the de facto leaders of political
parties, able to sway legions of federal and state legislators, and influence
millions of party members. Their grip over their parties ensures a base level
of support for almost all their acts, including such things as legislative pro-
posals, nominations, and regulatory initiatives.
Whereas the founders contemplated an electoral college exercising in-
dependent judgment,78 Americans now expect electors to reflect the senti-
ments of their state voters. This makes the presidency a plebiscitary office.
When states conduct presidential elections, people believe they are voting
for the President rather than for electors. Further, Americans expect that the
President will lead the entire government. They expect that he will be re-
sponsible for the entire economy, the welfare of citizens, and national de-
fense. He is not just a federal leader. He is the embodiment of the federal
government and is often seen as the federal leader.
The advent of technological advances in communications empowers
the President to reach out to the public to sway them in ways not conceived
at the founding. Washington’s short veto statements and terse national proc-
lamations about legal duties and obligations gave way to Andrew Jackson’s
long message defending his veto of the proposed Second Bank of the
United States, which in turn gave way to Franklin Roosevelt’s weekly fire-
side chats.79 Today, the President continues to address the country on a
weekly radio address. But his bully pulpit is so much more powerful. His
actions, utterances, and tweets utterly dominate the nightly news, the news-
papers and news magazines, and internet news and commentary.
Finally, in practical terms, presidents can amend the Constitution.
First, they can appoint justices who will prune and graft the living tree Con-
stitution. Roosevelt was condemned for attempting to add to the Supreme
Court’s cohort of Justices, what we now call “court packing.” But though
this plan failed, he packed the Court anyway, via the regular appointment
process. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, those who steadfastly de-
nied the constitutionality of Roosevelt’s revolutionary program, met the
same fate that awaits us all: retirement and death.  Roosevelt transformed
the Constitution by appointing successors who agreed with his more supple
78. Id. at 49–50.
79. Id. at 305–306.
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interpretation of federal legislative power.80 Second, presidents can alter the
separation of powers through repeated constitutional violations. For in-
stance, many suppose that modern presidents can wage war because their
successors acquired that power through repeated constitutional encroach-
ments upon congressional powers.81 Likewise, presidents can make treaties
without the concurrence of a supermajority of the Senate—they eschew the
label but make the functional equivalent via sole executive agreements or
via congressional-executive agreements.82 Somewhat paradoxically, illegal-
ity or unconstitutionality is now the engine of constitutional change.
IV. THE PRESIDENCY, AS IT MAY BE
The immediate past is often the best predictor of the immediate future.
Hence, expect more of the same. Indeed, expect much more of it. Expect
more executive reach and overreach. Expect more novel claims of constitu-
tional authority. And expect more constitutional transgressions that form
the building blocks of changes in constitutional conceptions. The execu-
tive’s past is its prologue.
What drives this compulsion to expand? Equal parts human nature,
expectations, and incentives. Most presidents become president because
they have a healthy, meaning potent, ambition to exercise power. Once they
get in the Oval Office, they naturally seek to aggrandize their constitutional
office because that helps satisfy their personal desire to exercise power. To
be sure, American politicians are typically socialized to believe that their
acts are in furtherance of some greater good—economic growth, social wel-
fare, individual rights. But though the policies and goals change, as do the
politicians, the ambition to exercise power remains virtually constant.
The desire for greater power also stems from the unrealistic public
expectations placed on presidents. We expect the President to fix and fine-
tune the economy. For instance, we demand job and income growth and
low inflation. If the economy does not oblige, the President is at fault. We
also hold the President accountable when trouble brews overseas and we
expect him to defend the nation, protect Americans abroad, and safeguard
American interests and property. We expect the President to balm the
wounds of national tragedy and solve emergencies. When conventional
means of securing prosperity and security—constitutional and statutory
means—are insufficient, our expectations are in no way tempered. When so
80. PETER G. RENSTROM, THE STONE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 12–15
(2001).
81. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 6 (2011), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf
(arguing that prior congressional approval was not required to use military force in Libya due to
the “‘historical gloss’ placed on the Constitution by two centuries of practice”).
82. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (affirming the president’s
power to settle claims of American nationals against a foreign country by sole executive agree-
ment considering the “long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress”).
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much is expected of our presidents, it is little wonder that they sometimes
feel compelled to improvise, stretching and straining the law to accomplish
what many of us demand of them.
Finally, the very idea of a living constitution, and its counterpart, liv-
ing statutes, invites presidents to creatively interpret and reinterpret law to
meet the expectations of the people and to satisfy their own desires for
power. When presidents push the envelope, they are not acting contrary to
the Constitution and its laws, except in a narrow, formalistic sense. Instead,
they are participating in the process by which law and understandings of it,
are constantly being amended. Moreover, constituents expect their presi-
dents to push the envelope as a means of advancing their shared agenda.
Indeed, they will demand it. There’s an old saying, “[i]f you aren’t cheating
you are not trying.” Presidents realize that if they are not stretching their
constitutional and statutory powers, they will be perceived as not “trying,”
meaning they will be regarded as too passive and docile.
One of the most recent examples relates to President Obama and De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). Prior to implementing
DACA, President Obama publicly denied that he could implement any such
program unilaterally. Legislation was necessary, he insisted.83 Obama’s
base would have none of this and roundly criticized him.84 Gradually, Presi-
dent Obama experienced a change of (legal) heart. Part of this undoubtedly
reflected his base’s fervent desire for incremental (but nonetheless signifi-
cant) change in the immigration status quo. President Obama gave them the
change they sought, doing what he previously declared he could not legally
do.85
Does this mean that presidents are always trying to acquire new pow-
ers? Is the Executive “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex[?]”86 Of course not. Presidents
balance a need to be seen as acting within the confines of the law with their
desire for power and their desire to satisfy their base and advance its inter-
ests. Interest groups that stand to lose from presidential action will squawk
that the President is acting illegally—behaving like King George III. And
there is the possibility that an inattentive public, generally (and rationally)
uninterested in most issues, will come to suppose that the President is acting
contrary to law primarily because of those who squawk. There is an optimal
amount of executive stretching and straining, meaning that there are subop-
83. See Michael D. Shear, For Obama, Executive Order Would Be a Turnabout, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/us/by-using-executive-order-on-immigra
tion-obama-would-reverse-long-held-stance.html.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Matt Wolking, 22 Times Obama Said He Couldn’t Ignore or Create His own
Immigration Law, SPEAKER PAUL RYAN (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.speaker.gov/general/22-
times-president-obama-said-he-couldn-t-ignore-or-create-his-own-immigration-law.
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (speak-
ing of legislative power).
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timal possibilities as well. Sometimes presidents are too aggressive and
other times they are too passive. The best presidents hope to occupy the
Goldilockian median.
All the above applies no less to President Donald Trump. For the next
three years, expect President Trump to continue to push the bounds of exec-
utive power. Expect more law professors to squawk. Expect more judges to
squeal. The legal elite did not like “43”—George W. Bush. So, they at-
tacked him. There were innumerable reports, petitions, and letters denounc-
ing this or that legal claim of the Bush administration.
That largely died down during the Obama administration. Some real
stalwarts—some steady and constant intellectuals—complained when Pres-
ident Obama did what President Bush did. I think of Bruce Ackerman, for
one, and his criticisms of President Obama’s declaration of war against
Libya.87 Louis Fisher also comes to mind for his consistent “congressional-
ist” approach to the separation of powers.88 There are undoubtedly others.
But many of the law professors who fired so many shots against President
Bush kept their powder dry during the Obama administration.
Things have changed, if you have not noticed. Now the legal academy
confronts “45”—President Trump. He is their walking-talking-tweeting
nightmare. We have heard any number of debatable claims against him. He
has violated the emoluments clause because foreign governments have
rented space in his hotels.89 His campaign violated the campaign finance
laws by meeting foreigners who sought to convey opposition research about
Hillary Clinton.90 He is guilty of obstruction of justice because he fired
James Comey and so despises the investigation into Russian hacking.91 He
is borderline treasonous.
Such charges are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the more
one throws up these charges, the more apt one is to stick and the more there
87. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html?mcubz=1&mtrref=www.google
.com&assetType=opinion (warning that the “legal machinations” Obama used to justify war with-
out Congressional approval set a “troubling precedent that could allow future administrations to
wage war at their convenience”).
88. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?, 42 Pres.
Stud. Q. 176, 186 (2012) (critiquing President Obama’s justification of his actions in Libya as
“double-talk”).
89. See, e.g., Norman L. Eisen, Richard Painter, & Laurence H. Tribe, The Emoluments
Clause: Its Text Meaning, and Application to Donald J. Trump, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Lauren Pearle, Trump Jr. Meeting with Russian Lawyer May Have Violated
Campaign Laws, Say Legal Experts, ABC NEWS (July 10, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
trump-jr-meeting-russian-lawyer-violated-campaign-laws/story?id=48557183.
91. See, e.g., Sean Illing, I Asked 6 Legal Experts if Trump Obstructed Justice. Here’s What
They Told Me, VOX (June 8, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/6/8/15742880/donald-trump-
james-comey-fbi-russia-investigation; Charlie Savage, Trump, Comey and Obstruction of Justice:
A Primer, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/us/politics/obstruc
tion-of-justice-trump-comey.html?mcubz=1&mtrref=www.google.com.
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is a definite impression on the part of some that there is fire behind the
smoke. On the other hand, innumerable spurious charges have the potential
to drown out the more serious claims. If people cry wolf too often—if it
seems that in the eyes of some almost everything the President does is ille-
gal—those exclamations and rebukes may cause people to ignore the carp-
ers. Denunciation fatigue may take hold.
This is lamentable. Perhaps more than most presidents, this president
is especially prone to seek a legal advantage. Yet if the president is said to
be violating the Constitution whenever he acts, speaks, or gesticulates, the
public will grow weary of it all. The stories of daily constitutional viola-
tions, many of them with barely a shred of merit, become like the dog-bites-
man stories because they do not merit any attention. Alternatively, they fuel
the claim that the media and the President’s critics are obsessed with fake
news and fake legal violations.
V. THE PRESIDENCY, AS IT COULD BE
President Trump treasures his book, The Art of the Deal. He brags that
it was “the No. 1 selling business book of all time.”92  He clearly delights in
critiquing the deals struck by others and likes to boast that he would have
struck a better deal himself. The Iranian Nuclear Agreement deal comes to
mind. He continually berates it as the “worst deal ever.”93 But I have to
think a deal like the Munich Agreement is worse because of its appease-
ment or maybe the Versailles Treaty because of the resentments it nour-
ished. In any event, President Trump clearly likes to make deals. For behind
every deal is a mutually advantageous bargain. Even though both sides ben-
efit from a deal, the President clearly enjoys imagining that he has squeezed
away the lion’s share of the gains from trade.
I believe that President Trump deeply cares about a handful of poli-
cies—immigration, trade, and infrastructure. I do not believe he cares a
whit about abstract questions of presidential power—the kind of issues con-
stitutional law professors obsess over. Given the right set of inducements, I
predict that President Trump will cheerfully trade away elements of the
status quo in return. So to borrow from another dealer, Monty Hall, “Let’s
Make a Deal.” Give President Trump something he wants, and we can
usher in a more constrained presidency.
What can Congress do to restrain the presidency, within the confines
of a Constitution that does not grant Congress carte blanche authority to
rework the separation of powers? Quite a bit. Congress has tremendous un-
92. See Heather Long, Trump’s Book “Art of the Deal” Is a Bestseller Again, CNNMONEY
(Dec. 20, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/15/investing/trump-art-of-the-deal-amazon/index
.html.
93. See, e.g., Bill O’Reilly’s Exclusive Interview with President Trump, FOX NEWS (Feb. 7,
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/02/07/bill-oreilly-exclusive-interview-with-presi
dent-trump.html.
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tapped authority. Congress holds the purse and enjoys power to carry into
execution the powers of the presidency. The reforms instituted in the wake
of the Watergate scandal point that way. Not all of those reforms were con-
stitutional.94 But nothing obliges Congress to repeat those mistakes.
1. Congress, by statute, should make high-ranking White House offi-
cials subject to advice and consent. It has, of course, already done this for
certain positions. The Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget are advice-and-consent positions,95 as is the US Trade
Representative96 and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control.97
But there are conspicuous omissions. The National Security Adviser is
one of the most consequential persons in Washington, DC. Think of Henry
Kissinger, who helped open up China. He surely was more powerful than
the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers.98 Think of Condoleezza Rice,
who had President Bush’s ear and his utter confidence.99 Controversial indi-
viduals like Susan Rice and Michael Flynn should be subject to Senate ad-
vice and consent. Such a check ensures a second vetting, one that goes
beyond the executive screening.
The same is true of the White House Counsel. The Counsel gives legal
advice to the President. Other people giving legal advice to cabinet offi-
cials—general counsels—are typically in advice and consent positions.
Consequential advisers like Bernard Nussbaum, Boyden Gray, or Donald
McGahn should be vetted by the Senate. I am not suggesting that any of
these people did anything wrong or that they would not get confirmed. But
they provide vital legal advice to the President and therefore occupy an
office of paramount significance.
One of the most powerful positions in Washington is the Chief of Staff
for the President. Think of Sherman Adams, Dick Cheney, and James
Baker. Typically, the Chief of Staff sets the President’s schedule, controls
the flow of information, decides which of the multitude of high-ranking
officials gets to meet with the President in a more confined setting (face-
time), and is a principal adviser. This position, which is far more important
than hundreds of other positions that are advice-and-consent, ought to be
subject to Senate review. Indeed, last year we witnessed the Director of
94. For instance, I think the special prosecutor provisions under the Ethics in Government
Act violated Article II. See Act of Oct. 26, 1978, Title VI, sec. 60, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 591).
95. See 31 U.S.C. § 502(a), (c) (2012).
96. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)(1) (2012).
97. See 21 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1)(A) (2012).
98. See Seymour M. Hersh, Kissinger and Nixon in the White House, THE ATLANTIC (May
1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/05/kissinger-and-nixon-in-the-white-
house/308778/.
99. See generally GLENN KESSLER, THE CONFIDANTE: CONDOLEEZZA RICE AND THE CREA-
TION OF THE BUSH LEGACY (2007).
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Homeland Security, John Kelly, relinquish that office to take on the more
important posting of Chief of Staff.100
I do not mean to be exhaustive here. There may be other positions in
the White House complex that ought to be subject to advice and consent.
The point is that several of the most powerful Washingtonian offices cur-
rently are not subject to the Senate’s advice and consent, and they ought to
be. I also do not mean to be critical of current or past occupants. It is true,
however, that some White House officials would never have been in the
West Wing had the Senate exercised a check on their initial appointment.
Others can judge whether a Senate check would have had a salutary effect
on the relevant Presidencies.
2. A second reform would be to shutter the Chevron station. The Chev-
ron doctrine is under great attack, with Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil
Gorsuch leading the charge.101 Under current doctrine, courts construe
many statutes as requiring courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable con-
struction of those statutes.102 Rather than adopt this framework, which
amounts to something of a presumption in favor of deference to agency, I
think that Chevron deference should only exist when Congress makes clear
its desire. When it does not make that preference manifest, the ordinary
rule—courts decide statutory questions de novo—ought to apply.
3. A third reform, somewhat related to the second, would be to curtail
excessive delegations of legislative authority. There are some who doubt
the constitutionality of the countless delegations of legislative power that
litter Statutes at Large and the US Code. But put these concerns to one side
for now. There are distinct policy reasons for doubting the wisdom of al-
lowing executive and independent agencies to write laws under the guise of
writing rules. To begin with, the proliferation of scores of “junior-varsity”
Congresses makes it more difficult for the public to gauge the outputs of
Washington. More importantly for our purposes, the delegations to execu-
tive branch institutions make the executive rather powerful. Baron de Mon-
tesquieu predicted that tyranny would result from the combination of
legislative and executive powers, for tyrannical laws might be executed ty-
rannically.103 I do not think that such tyranny is a regular occurrence as
things currently stand. But our system could stand to use more separation of
the legislative and executive functions. There is practical wisdom in the
Montesquieuean maxim that we ignore at our own peril.
100. See Dan Merica, Kelly Sworn in as Trump’s Second Chief of Staff, CNN (July 31, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/politics/john-kelly-chief-of-staff/index.html.
101. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (not-
ing that Chevron deference raises “serious” constitutional questions by precluding judges from
exercising their “independent judgment” when interpreting statutes); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,
834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron is “more
than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”).
102. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).
103. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 61, at 173. R
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4. During the Nixon administration, Congress tried to reassert its con-
trol over war powers in the War Powers Resolution. Many judge it a failure.
Whether that judgment is fair turns on the counterfactual—how many more
wars would presidents have commenced in its absence? We do not know
the answer to that question. But given recent presidential wars in Libya and
Syria, it is perhaps useful to strengthen that Resolution.
Congress can put stronger teeth, with actual bite, in the War Powers
Act. Congress could provide that if a president attacks another nation with-
out congressional authorization, the attack immediately triggers a reduction
in the Pentagon budget by three quarters. Everyone agrees that Congress
controls the purse strings and can decide whether (and how much) to fund
the armed forces and the wars they wage. This would be Congress flexing
its fiscal muscles to make clear that presidential adventures are disfavored,
if not forbidden.
The draconian cut in defense funding would incentivize presidents to
secure congressional preapproval of wars. Alternatively, it would require
the President to go to Congress and quickly secure funding after the fact.
Either way, Congress would have to weigh in and could refuse to authorize
(or sanction) new presidential wars.
5. Congress may, if it chooses, effectively end the practice of signing
statements. Specifically, Congress could include a poison pill in its statutes:
a non-severability clause. Congress sometimes does this with respect to ju-
dicial decisions that declare that a portion of a statute is unconstitutional.
Non-severability clauses, as they exist now, provide that if a portion of the
statute is declared unconstitutional (presumably by the courts), the entire
statute is null and void.
Congress could extend the concept of a non-severability clause to ex-
ecutive declarations of unconstitutionality. If a president declares, in a sign-
ing statement or otherwise, that some portion of a statute is
unconstitutional, Congress can provide that the entire statute is null and
void.
Such a poison pill would have the effect of encouraging Congress and
the President to work out their constitutional differences before the bill gets
sent to the President. As things stand now, there seems to be little in the
way of genuine constitutional dialogue. Congress takes its position as ex-
pressed in the statute, and the President takes his. There is no give and take
because there does not need to be. The President rarely brings matters to a
head by vetoing a bill on constitutional grounds. A poison pill facilitates
and encourages that serious deliberation necessary to sound defense of the
Constitution.104
104. An alternative would be to include a limited non-severability clause. If the President
declares a portion of the statute to be unconstitutional, certain portions of the statute (those pre-
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6. Congress could openly declare its considered position that executive
privilege does not apply vis-a`-vis Congress. While the desirability for confi-
dentiality goes without saying, the need for congressional oversight of the
executive has constitutional dimensions. Congress could pass a statute, reg-
ulating the use of executive privilege vis-a`-vis third parties (entities other
than Congress) and in that statute signal that the President cannot assert
executive privilege with respect to congressional demands for investigation.
7. Declaring one’s sense of the Constitution yields benefits, as the dis-
cussion above suggests. Along the same lines, Congress could pass a ge-
neric resolve making it clear that Congress disapproves of executive
amendments of statutes and the Constitution. More precisely, Congress
could make it clear that it does not believe that federal law, in its many
forms, authorizes the President to act at variance with existing laws, either
as a means of changing those laws or otherwise. Congress could also reject
the claim that consistent executive practice, without more, yields a change
the Constitution and statutes. Finally, Congress could denounce the maxim
“[q]ui tacet consentit,” thereby denying that its silence signals implicit con-
gressional acceptance of executive action.
Similar declarations have been enacted in the past. One that comes to
mind is the Senate’s rejection of the idea that treaties should be read dy-
namically. The Senate issued this rejection in the wake of the Reagan ad-
ministration’s attempt to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in a
manner inconsistent with the original conception that prevailed in the Sen-
ate when it granted its consent.105 The Senate attached this rejection to the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (“INF”) Treaty of 1988106 and subse-
quently repeated it in several advice and consent resolutions.107
8. Congress should take another page out of its playbooks from the
past, reaching back to episodes where the chambers have passed resolutions
condemning particular acts of presidential aggrandizement. The House in-
sisted on its right to information from President Washington regarding the
controversial Jay Treaty.108 Decades later, the Senate censured Andrew
sumably favored by the president) would be inoperative. This allows portions of the statute to
continue to hold sway while tethering together the potentially more controversial and vexing parts.
105. See Susan F. Rasky, Senate, by 93–5, Gives Reagan a Victory on Missile Treaty; In Time
for Summit Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/28/world/sen
ate-93-5-gives-reagan-victory-missile-treaty-time-for-summit-meeting.html?mcubz=1.
106. See Resolution of Advice and Consent of 27 May 1988 to the Intermediate-Range Nu-
clear Missiles Treaty, S. Res., 100th Cong., 134 CONG. REC. 12849 (1988).
107. See, e.g., Resolution of Advice and Consent of 25 November 1991 to the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, S. Res., 102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC. 34348 (1991),
adopted id. at 34545–34546 (affirming the “applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-
based principles of treaty interpretation set forth” in the INF Treaty).
108. See PRAKASH, supra note 19, at 300. R
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Jackson’s removal of the Treasury Secretary.109 The House censured James
Polk for “unconstitutionally” commencing the Mexican-American War.110
Censures and declarations serve a purpose. They lay out markers about
what Congress takes to be permissible and impermissible behavior. They
thus supply notice to the other two branches. They also call upon members
to engage with the Constitution and state, for the record, their views on
some weighty matters of public import. Members should be willing to take
stands on whether matters like DACA, the Syrian War, and President
Trump’s immigration executive orders are constitutional.
Censures and declarations are easier to pass than impeachment mo-
tions because they are less consequential and because they tend to turn on
questions of law rather than on questions of fact.  In the Senate, a censure is
easier to pass than an impeachment conviction for an additional reason;
while the latter requires a two-thirds majority, the former only needs a sim-
ple majority.  Finally, censures enable Congress to respond with a more
appropriate level of indignation or outrage. Think of censure as a graduated
sanction that makes some level of sanction (and thus some level of deter-
rence) more probable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing proposals are obviously not a panacea. They will not rid
our nation of the difficulties associated with an imperial presidency. Nor do
they speak to the institutional torpidity, sclerosis, and timidity that Congress
evinces from time to time. Congress must act to thwart an aggrandizing
executive. But the very forces that have conspired to prevent such a reaction
will not disappear merely because of a law review article that lists some
suggestions. Borrowing from Justice Robert Jackson’s wisdom (issued in
another context) we can,
have no illusion that any [law review article] can keep power in
the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its
problems. . . . If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the
maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to the man
who can use them.” . . . [O]nly Congress itself can prevent power
from slipping through its fingers.111
For any serious reform to materialize, members of Congress must
adopt the institutional perspective even as they cling to the party perspec-
tive. This is utterly possible. After all, legislators can promote different per-
spectives in other areas. Farm state legislators exhibit a remarkable degree
109. Id.
110. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848).
111. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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of unity across parties on farm matters, for instance. In that case, they insist
upon regional interests at the expense of party unity.
Members of Congress must realize that most of them will spend their
remaining political careers on Capitol Hill, not in the White House. Most of
them have no shot at the Oval Office. That being the case, they must see
that their more realistic ambitions dovetail well with maintaining the insti-
tutional prerogatives of the legislature. Perhaps they should read (or reread)
Federalist No. 51 and ponder the wisdom of Madison’s adage that the con-
stitutional system depends upon “[a]mbition . . . counteract[ing] ambition.
The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place.”112 Too often the interests of the men and women of Congress are
not sufficiently connected with the rights of the place. It is time for that to
change.
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed. 1961).
